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Increasing work incentives for people with low income is a common topic in
the policy debate across European countries. The “Mini-Job” reform in Ger-
many had a similar motivation. We carry out an ex-post evaluation to identify
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nous variation in the interview months in the SOEP, that allows us to distin-
guish groups that are affected by the reform from those who are not. To account
for seasonal effects we additionally use a difference-in-differences strategy. De-
scriptives show that there is a post-reform increase in the number of Mini-jobs.
However, we show that this increase can not be causally related to the reform,
since the short-run effects are very limited only. Only single men seem to react
immediately and increase secondary job holding.
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1 Introduction
As a response to persistently high unemployment rates, especially of low-skilled peo-
ple, wage subsidies have been intensively discussed in European countries. Following
the example of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) introduced in the 70s in the US
(see, e.g., Scholz, 1996), several European countries have introduced in-work benefits,
tax credits, or subsidies to social security contributions (SSC) for working individ-
uals. Examples are the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK (see, e.g.,
Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir, 2000) and the French Prime Pour l’Emploi
(see, e.g., Stancanelli, 2005).1 The “Mini-Job” reform introduced in Germany in 2003
had a similar motivation. The main objective of this reform was to provide positive
work incentives for people with low earnings potential by subsidising social security
contributions. The government expected to achieve that goal by exempting labour
income up to 400 euro from employees’ SSC and introducing a degressive subsidy for
earnings between 401 and 800 euro. To be specific, this reform included three major
changes compared to pre-reform regulations. First, the maximum amount for earnings
exempted from SSC was increased from 325 to 400 euro. Jobs with earnings less than
this threshold (marginal employment) are from then on labeled mini-jobs. Second,
the previous maximum hours restriction (15 hours per week) was abolished. Third,
income up to 400 euro per month from a mini-job held as a secondary job, which was
fully taxable before the reform, is now exempted from SSC and income tax.2
The expected labour supply effects of wage subsidies, which consist of the effect
on the participation as well as on the hours worked, depend on the design of the
policy instrument and on various other institutional and economic factors (see, e.g.,
Blundell, 2000, or Moffit, 2003). The expectation of unambiguously positive effects on
labour force participation is based on two conditions. First, the subsidies have to be
targeted at individual income rather than household income, and second, the reform
has to change the incentives to take up work for recipients of unemployment benefits or
other social transfers. The subsidies under the German “Mini-Job” reform are indeed
targeted at the individual level; however, the budget constraint for recipients of social
transfers hardly changes due to strict withdrawal of earnings, as is shown in Steiner
1For a detailed overview of recent European “Making Work Pay” policy reforms, see Orsini (2006).
2See Steiner and Wrohlich (2005) for a more detailed description of the reform. Note that the
reform did not change employers’ SSC except for mini-jobs in private households. Hence, there is no
reason for a marked increase in the overall demand for marginal employment.
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and Wrohlich (2005). Additionally, it should be noted, that without a minimum hours
restriction, the reform provides subsidies for all kinds of low-earnings jobs, whether
low earnings result from low wages or short working hours. Hence, the reform cannot
be directly compared to programmes such as the WFTC. The differences between the
“Mini-Job” reform and the other mentioned reforms are even more pronounced when
one looks at the incentives to take up a secondary job. After the reform, earnings from
a secondary job—defined as a job which is held in addition to a primary job bound to
social security contributions—are not only exempted from social security contributions
but also from the income tax. Thus, incentives to take up such a job have markedly
increased.
Already very shortly after its introduction, the “Mini-Job” reform was portrayed by
different official sources as quite successful in generating new employment. The Federal
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs stated in July 2003 that three months after the
reform, 930,000 new jobs had been created.3 These numbers were corrected by the
Federal Employment Agency in November 2003, who stated that one month after the
reform, there was an increase in marginal employment of as high as 79,000 individuals
and an increase of secondary jobs by 580,000. However, it is not clear whether this
increase is causally related to the reform, since based on the theoretical reasoning
above—if at all—only small effects can be exp cted. Hence, an ex-post evaluation is
called for. This is an especially difficult task here, since from 2004 onwards various
other legal changes have been introduced which might affect labour supply decisions
of individuals simultaneously. Therefore, it should be obvious that a comparison of
the mini-jobs realised in 2004 with pre-reform numbers will not reveal the true effect
of the reform. Furthermore, in contrast to other evaluation studies of labour market
policies, the distinction between control and treatment groups is not initially clear,
since the reform is relevant for the whole population. A thorough evaluation has to
take these points into consideration and should be based on a credible identification
strategy. We will do so by using the exogenous variation in the interview date of
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The interviews are conducted between
January and October in each year. Since the reform was introduced on April 1, 2003,
we observe some people who are interviewed before the reform and others interviewed
3See press-release of the “Mini-Job-Zentrale” from July 18th, 2003: “930,000 neue Jobs durch
geringfu¨gig Bescha¨ftigte”.
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after the new legislation was implemented. This allows us to estimate the immediate
short-run effect of the reform. To account for seasonal variation, we additionally use
a difference-in-differences approach.
Our results show that, although there has been a rise in marginal employment
after the introduction of the “Mini-Job” reform, this rise cannot be causally related
to the reform. In the short run, we do not find a significant effect of the reform on
marginal employment. However, we do find evidence for a positive effect on secondary
job-holding for single men. We will explain our identification strategy in more detail
in Section 2, where we will also describe the data used for the analysis. Section 3
contains the estimation results, before Section 4 concludes.
2 Evaluation Strategy and Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a sam-
ple gathering socio-demographic and financial information about 12,000 representative
households each year. We will use the waves for the years 2002 and 2003. The individu-
als are interviewed in person from January until October each year.4 Our identification
of the treatment effect of the reform will be based on this exogenous variation in the
interview month.
2.1 Evaluation Design
As already mentioned we want to evaluate the effects of the reform on some out-
come Y , for example, the probability of beginning a mini-job for certain groups of
the population. In the usual microeconometric evaluation framework (the “potential
outcome approach”, most commonly called the Roy (1951)-Rubin (1974) model), the
treatment effect ∆ is given by a comparison of the treatment outcome (Y 1) with a
hypothetical situation where the same individual does not receive treatment (Y 0), i.e.:
∆ = Y 1 − Y 0. The fundamental evaluation problem arises because we can never ob-
serve both potential outcomes for the same individual at the same time. A simple
comparison between outcomes of treated and untreated individuals is not possible if
they are selective groups, that is when the condition E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0)
4For a detailed description of the data, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2003).
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does not hold, where D is a binary treatment indicator. Let us transfer this general
framework to our evaluation question, before we present our identification strategy.
The “Mini-Job” reform was introduced on April 1, 2003, and applies to the whole
population. Hence, we have no direct treatment group which has received the treat-
ment and whose outcome we could compare with a control group who did not receive
the treatment.5 The whole population before April 1, 2003, was not affected by the re-
form, while the whole population after April 1, 2003, was affected by it. It should also
be noted that the whole population was (not) affected by the reform in 2004 (2002).
Comparing the outcomes between these two years (Y 12004 − Y 02002) will not give us the
actual treatment effect, since other regulations were also changed. Most significant of
these were changes in the income tax as part of the German Tax Reform. From 2003
to 2004, the basic allowance was increased from 7,235 to 7,664 euro per year, the tax
rate of the first tax bracket was reduced from 19.9 to 16.0 percent, and the top tax
rate was reduced from 48.5 to 45.0 percent. Clearly, this reform also affected labour
supply decisions of individuals with low earnings.6
However, the timing of the SOEP interviews gives us an opportunity to identify
the true treatment effect. As mentioned above, the SOEP interviews are conducted
between January and October of each year. We argue that the random variation of
the interviews mimics a natural experiment, where we can compare the effects for
the group of participants, i.e. the people who were interviewed when the reform was
already implemented in t2003, with the group of controls, i.e. the people who were
interviewed before the reform was implemented in t2003′
7:
∆ = Y 12003 − Y 02003′ . (1)
Most of the interviews are accomplished within the first quarter. In fact, by default
households are contacted by the interviewers in the first quarter of each year. If this
contact is not successful, whether because no one is at home or the household has
moved to another address, households are contacted again in the second quarter of the
5Recent examples for evaluation studies with a ‘classical’ distinction between treatment and control
groups can be found in Andren and Andren (2006), Fertig (2007) or Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen
(2007).
6For a detailed description and an estimation of labour supply reactions to this tax reform see
Haan and Steiner (2005). They show that total hours worked increase by about 1% due to this
reform.
7The superscript ′ behind year information indicates the first quarter of the year, year information
without superscript indicates quarters 2-4.
5
Page 5 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
year and so on. Since on average most of the post-reform interviews are completed by
May 20038, it should also be clear that we are only able to estimate the immediate
short-run effects of the reform.
A problem which might arise with this approach are potential differences in un-
observed characteristics (UC) between individuals interviewed before April and those
interviewed after April as well as seasonal employment effects (SEE). If employment in
the mini-job sector varies heavily within a year or if the two groups differ in unobserved
characteristics the above-mentioned approach becomes invalid since
Y 12003 − Y 02003′ = ∆+ SEE + UC. (2)
To account for these potential sources of bias, we apply a control mechanism based
on the difference-in-differences (DID) approach9, using the seasonal variation and un-
observed differences in the year 2002 to account for the seasonal variation and unob-
served differences in 2003. Clearly, this assumption is only valid if both patterns have
not changed over the two years, such that SEE2003 = SEE2002 and UC2003 = UC2002.
10
The treatment effect is then given by (see also Figure 1):
∆ = (Y 12003 − Y 02003′)− (Y 02002 − Y 02002′). (3)
Since we are using cross-sectional information from two waves of the SOEP, the
populations in 2002 and 2003 as well as the populations in the first and subsequent
quarters might not be the same. To account for variations in observable characteristics,
we specify the outcome variable Y in a parametric way and estimate the effect on the
whole sample with interaction effects.
The equation we will estimate can be specified as
y∗i = β1 ∗ d2003i + β2 ∗ afteri + β3 ∗ d2003× afteri + γ′Xi + εi, (4)
where y∗i is a latent variable such as the propensity to be marginally employed or to
hold a secondary job (the outcome variables will be specified in more detail in Section
8In 2003 80% of interviews were conducted in the first quarter, 8% in April, 5% in May, 4% in
June and the rest (3%) between July and October.
9See, for example, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for an overview.
10Looking at the GDP growth between 2002 and 2003 shows that there has been only a small
change of 0.8% between these two years. More importantly, the change between the first and second
quarter in both years was about 2%.
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Figure 1: Definition of the Subsamples According to the SOEP Interview Month
"Mini-Job"-Reform 
introduced on 1.4.2003
t
2002
1.41.4 1.11.1 1.1
2003SOEP-Interview Month
0
2003 'Y
0
2002Y
0
2002'Y
1
2003Y
2.2), d2003i is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is observed in 2003,
after is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is observed after the first
quarter of a year, and d2003 × after is an interaction term of these two variables.
Vector Xi summarises control variables such as age, education, family status, number
of children, health status, etc., and εi is an unobserved error term. The βs and the
vector γ include the respective coefficients. We are particularly interested in β3, which
yields the causal effect of the reform. Since we do not observe the latent variable
y∗i , but the binary outcome variables yi, we will estimate equation (4) using a probit
model. The marginal effect corresponding to the coefficient β3 can thus be interpreted
as change in the probability of the outcome variable (e.g. marginal employment) due
to the reform.
It might be argued that this evaluation design leads to a downward bias of our
results since the “Mini-Job” reform has been announced a few months before its intro-
duction. Thus, individuals might have started to search for a job already before April
2003. We argue, though, that even if people started to search for a job before April
2003 there was no incentive to start the job before April 1st under the old legislation.
Thus, when asked about their employment status, we do not expect an effect for those
individuals interviewed before April 1st, 2003.
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2.2 Outcome Variables, Subgroups and Some Descriptive Statis-
tics
We are interested in two outcome variables, namely the probability of being in marginal
employment (“geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigung”) and the probability of having a secondary
job (“Nebenerwerbsta¨tigkeit”), since the incentives to take up these two types of jobs
have been changed by the “Mini-Job” reform. Examining the effects on secondary
job holding seems to be especially relevant, since there is evidence that the strong
increase in mini-jobs after the introduction of the reform was not caused by new jobs
taken up by individuals who were previously not employed. Instead it is likely that a
share of the new mini-jobs were jobs taken up by individuals who had already been
working.11 Thus, in addition to the analysis of marginal employment, we are particu-
larly interested in the effect of the reform on secondary job holding. Furthermore, we
also analyse the effect on the labour supply of students. This group was even more
affected by the reform, because the SSC-exemption threshold is at the same time the
exemption limit of earned income for recipients of student aid.12
In the SOEP data, there are several questions containing information about em-
ployment status, working hours, earnings, and job characteristics. We use the following
definitions for the two outcome variables of interest. An individual is defined to be in
marginal employment if
- the answer to employment status is “marginally employed”, or
- the answer to employment status is “part-time employed” and gross monthly
earnings are reported to be less than 400 euro, or
- the answer to job characteristics is “this job is a 325 euro/400 euro Job”, or
- the answer to employment status is “not working” and the individual reports
having a secondary job with gross monthly earnings less than 400 euro.
Note that we use the post-reform threshold of 400 euro for all individuals (inter-
viewed before and after the reform), since we are not interested in redefinitions of
already existing jobs.
11For details see Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2003).
12Note that jobs with a monthly income between 400 and 800 Euro might become more attractive
under the reform as well. However, in this paper we only look at “marginal employment”, which
refers to jobs with an income up to 400 Euro per month.
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Relating to the second outcome variable, we define an individual as holding a
secondary job if
- the answer to employment status is “full-time employed” or “part-time em-
ployed” and the individual reports gross monthly earnings from regular or ir-
regular secondary jobs less than 400 euro.
Table 1 shows the total number of observations in the four subsamples, interviewed
before and after April 1st in 2002 and 2003, respectively. To analyse the changes with
respect to marginal employment we look at the whole population, whereas we focus
on individuals who are full- or part-time employed to analyse secondary job-holding.
For both analyses we focus on individuals aged between 16 and 70 years.
Results of several ex-ante evaluation studies (see Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005, or
Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and, Orsini, 2006) have shown that the reaction to the reform
differs between population subgroups. For example, women in couple households have
been shown to adjust their labour supply to a greater extent than men. Therefore, we
differentiate between several subgroups in our analysis. In particular, we run separate
estimations for men, women and students and include interaction terms for individuals
living in single and couple households.
Table 1: Number of Observations, Marginal and Secondary Employment in
the Subsamples
Marginal Secondary
Subsample Employment Employment
Group (Interviewed in...) Obs. Abs. Share Obs. abs. Share
Men before 7007 267 0.0381 4372 160 0.03662002
after
April 1st
2240 91 0.0406 1530 59 0.0386
before 7102 313 0.0441 4367 168 0.03852003
after
April 1st
1805 99 0.0548 1199 53 0.0442
Women before 7366 872 0.1184 3422 119 0.03482002
after
April 1st
2405 352 0.1464 1178 43 0.0365
before 7527 1020 0.1355 3494 118 0.03382003
after
April 1st
1917 307 0.1601 956 35 0.0366
Note: The high income sample of the SOEP is not included, since this entire group was
interviewed after April in the 2003 wave. Numbers for marginal employment refer to
the whole population between 16 and 70 years old. Numbers for secondary employment
refer to the whole population holding a full- or part-time job (between 16 and 70 years
old).
Source: SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
Table 1 also shows the total number of observations marginally employed or hold-
ing a secondary job. We see that marginal employment is more prevalent among
9
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women than men, whereas the opposite is true for secondary job holding. Addition-
ally, marginal employment is higher in the second and third quarter of both years when
compared to the first quarter. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that we observe
an increase in marginal employment from the first quarter of 2002 to the first quarter
of 2003.
Before we turn to the estimation results, we look at some descriptives of the co-
variates used in the estimations. Thereby we differentiate the four subsamples under
consideration. As can be seen from Table 1, there are far fewer observations in the two
subsamples “interviewed after April 1st”, which is due to the interview routine of the
SOEP already described. Therefore, the group of individuals interviewed after April
1st might be systematically different from those interviewed in the first three months.
Table 2: Some Descriptive Statistics - Differentiated by Interview Date
2002 2003 Test of
Before After Before After mean equality1
April 1st April 1st April 1st April 1st (p-value)
Age 43.62 41.22 43.64 41.61 0.088
Female 0.512 0.518 0.515 0.515 0.323
No Educational Degree 0.017 0.026 0.018 0.024 0.205
High School Degree 0.201 0.240 0.207 0.243 0.327
Vocational Training 0.658 0.618 0.657 0.615 0.389
Academic 0.170 0.191 0.172 0.186 0.197
Disabled 0.096 0.074 0.095 0.078 0.204
Married 0.640 0.613 0.623 0.625 0.000
Single 0.170 0.183 0.175 0.178 0.087
Cohabiting Couple 0.203 0.223 0.214 0.219 ?!?
German 0.919 0.864 0.923 0.862 0.176
Living in East Germany 0.285 0.139 0.290 0.105 0.000
Children under 15 0.329 0.357 0.318 0.361 0.046
Source: SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
1 p-values refer to a test of the following hypothesis: H0 : (X2003−X2003′)−(X2002−X2002′) = 0.
Note that—as already discussed—even if the “after” groups differ systematically
from the “before” groups with respect to unobservable characteristics, this does not
flaw our results as long as we assume that the differences are the same in 2002 and
2003. The only assumption that needs to be valid for our study is that the interview
month of the 2003 wave is independent of the introduction of the “Mini-Job” reform on
April 1, 2003. We tested the significance of the differences across the four subsamples
using a t-test of mean equality. Thereby we tested the hypothesis that the difference-in-
differences of the covariates equals zero, i.e., H0 : (X2003−X2003′)−(X2002−X2002′) = 0.
10
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Looking at the p-values in column 5 of Table 2 shows that the differences are in fact not
different from zero for most of the variables. Exceptions (at the 5%-significance level)
are the marital status, living in East Germany13 and children under 15. To take care
of these small remaining differences, we control for the covariates in the parametric
estimation of the treatment effect in the next section.
3 Results
Since we expect different effects for men and women as well as for students, we per-
form separate analyses for these groups. For men and women, we run estimations for
two outcome variables, namely marginal employment (Section 3.1) and secondary job
holding (Section 3.2). For students we combine these two outcome variables into one
due to the limited number of observations (Section 3.3). For all subgroups and out-
come variables, we run three probit estimations, respectively. The first estimation is
only for the year 2003, and includes a dummy indicating “interviewed after April 1st”
as a single explanatory variable. This corresponds to the “raw” effect of the reform,
without controlling for potential seasonal effects or possible differences in observable
or unobservable characteristics between individuals interviewed in and after the first
quarter of 2003. In the second estimation, we control for differences in observable char-
acteristics by including a set of control variables such as age, educational variables,
regional variables, marital status, and number of children. Finally, in the third esti-
mation we pool data from 2002 and 2003, and include two more variables, a dummy
indicating the year 2003 and an interaction term between this year dummy and the
“interviewed after April 1st” dummy (see equation 4). Note that this variable mea-
sures the effect that the “Mini-Job” reform had on the outcome variable, controlling
for seasonal effects, observable and time-invariant unobservable characteristics that
differ between the groups interviewed in and after the first quarter of each year.
13Given the differences in this variable, we have also performed the analysis separately for East
and West Germany, which did not yield different results from the ones we will present in the next
section.
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3.1 Effects on Marginal Employment
Table 3 shows a short summary of the estimation results for marginal employment,
where we have displayed marginal effects. Full estimation results, including the coef-
ficients and standard errors of the control variables, can be found in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. For men, the first model indicates that the “raw” effect of the reform is
positive, i.e. in the second and third quarter of 2003 we observe more men in marginal
employment than in the first quarter of 2003. This is still true if we control for dif-
ferences in observable characteristics, as can be seen from column 2. This is in line
with the descriptive statistics showing a post-reform increase in marginal employment.
However, to answer the question whether this increase is causally related to the reform
we have to look at the third column. The third column shows the estimation of the
pooled sample of 2002 and 2003 including a dummy variable indicating the year 2003,
and an interaction term of this dummy with the dummy indicating “interviewed after
the reform”. We further interacted this variable with the “single” dummy, because
ex-ante studies have shown different reactions to the reform by singles and individu-
als living with a partner. Doing so allows us to calculate marginal effects for singles
and couples separately.14 Our results show, that as far as the probability of being
marginally employed is concerned, neither single men nor men living in couples react
to the reform.
Similar to what we observe for men, we find a positive and significant “raw” effect of
the reform for women (see column 4). This effect disappears, however, once we control
for socio-demographics (column 5) and for differences in seasonal employment effects
and unobservable characteristics between the “before” and “after” samples (column
6). Note that in the full model presented in column 6, the coefficients of the variables
after and d2003 are positive and significant, indicating that for women the probability
of being marginally employed is higher in the second and third quarter of each year,
and that this probability is also higher in 2003. However, there is no causal effect of
the reform, which would be caught by the effect of the variables after × 2003 and
14Note that the marginal effect of the interaction term is not equal to the magnitude of the in-
teraction effect in non-linear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003). In order to calculate the absolute
treatment effect for couples and singles, we use the following formula: Φ(β̂after + β̂2003+ β̂after2003+
γ̂′X)−Φ(β̂after+ γ̂′X)−Φ(β̂2003+ γ̂′X)+Φ(γ̂′X) where Φ is the cdf of the normal distribution. For
singles, the marginal effect corresponds to Φ(β̂after + β̂2003 + β̂single + β̂after2003 + β̂after2003single +
γ̂′X)− Φ(β̂after + β̂single + γ̂′X)− Φ(β̂2003 + β̂single + γ̂′X) + Φ(β̂single + γ̂′X). The corresponding
standard errors are calculated using the Delta method.
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Table 3: Estimation Results (Marginal Effects) - Marginal Employment
Variable Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3(a) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3(a)
after 0.0108* 0.0132** 0.0036 0.0246*** 0.0062 0.0171**
(0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0080)
d2003 0.0045* 0.0195***
(0.0024) (0.0041)
after×2003 (Couples) 0.0090 -0.0092
(0.0067) (0.0108)
after×2003 (Singles) 0.0145 -0.0158
(0.0135) (0.0247)
Controlled for Covariates no yes yes no yes yes
Log-Likelihood -1666.813 -1529.5 -2919.3 -3829.5 -3664.7 -7183.4
Observations 8,907 8,907 18,154 9,444 9,444 19,215
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses) correct
for correlation across repeated observations of individuals.
(a) Model 3 has also been estimated without the interaction term ‘after×2003 (Singles)’. The marginal
effect for men is 0.0084 (s.e. 0.0065), for women -0.0105 (s.e. 0.0094).
Covariates include: age, age2, no education, high school degree, vocational training, academic, disabled,
married, single, german, number of children in different age classes, and a dummy for living in East
Germany. See also Table A.1.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
after × 2003 × single (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). To check whether certain
subgroups of the population were particularly affected by the reform, we have, for
example, also included interaction terms of after×2003 and low− skilled in separate
estimations. However, we did not find any significant effects.15 Moreover, we evaluated
the marginal effects not only at the sample mean, but also for several subgroups (e.g.
with respect to education, marital status and number of children) which did not change
our results.
Thus, our first conclusion is that in the short-run (defined as about two months
after the reform), there has not been a significant change in marginal employment that
could be causally related to the legislation introduced on April 1st, 2003. However,
at least for women, marginal employment seems to be higher in the summer months
than in winter and higher in 2003 than in 2002.
3.2 Effects on Secondary Job Holding
Let us now turn to the analysis of the probability of holding a secondary job. As
already explained above, for these estimations we focus on the sample of full-time or
15These estimation results are available on request from the authors.
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part-time employed individuals only. As Table 4 (column 1) shows, there seems to
be no significant “raw” effect of the reform for men, as the share of men holding a
secondary job does not differ between the first and the subsequent quarters of 2003.16
This is also true if we control for differences in observed characteristics (column 2) and
for differences in seasonal employment effects and time-invariant unobserved charac-
teristics (column 3).
Table 4: Estimation Results (Marginal Effects) - Secondary Employment
Variable Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3(a)Model 1 Model 2 Model 3(a)
after 0.0058 0.0051 0.0012 0.0030 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0054) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0057)
d2003 0.0017 -0.0009
(0.0030) (0.0033)
after×2003 (Couples) -0.0015 0.0017
(0.0072) (0.0087)
after×2003 (Singles) 0.0311 -0.0023
(0.0198) (0.0207)
Controlled for Covariates no yes yes no yes yes
Log-Likelihood -929.1 -891.6 -1794.2 -665.8 -644.4 -1324.8
Observations 5,564 5,564 11,466 4,447 4,447 9,047
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses)
correct for correlation across repeated observations of individuals.
(a) Model 3 has also been estimated without the interaction term ‘after×2003 (Singles)’. The
marginal effect for men is 0.0031 (s.e. 0.0072), for women 0.0009 (s.e. 0.0078).
Covariates include: age, age2, no education, high school degree, vocational training, academic,
disabled, married, single, german, number of children in different age classes, a dummy for living
in East Germany, industry class, full-time employment dummy, and overtime. See also Table
A.2.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
However, as the results of this estimation show (see Table A.2 in the Appendix), we
do find a positive effect for single men that is significant at the 10 percent level. The
marginal effect corresponding to this coefficient amounts to 0.031. This implies that
for single men, the probability of having a secondary job increases by 3.1 percentage
points. Since the probability of holding a secondary job before the reform for single
men is 3.7 percent, this effect almost implies a doubling of secondary employment in
this group. However, the standard error of the marginal effect amounts to 0.0198.17
The marginal effect is thus not significant at the 10 percent level, the empirical signifi-
cance level amounting to 11.5%. Given the economic significance of the effect and the
16Full estimation results can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
17Statistical (non)significance of the estimated coefficient of the interaction term does not neces-
sarily imply (non)significance of the marginal effect of this variable in non-linear models (see Ai and
Norton, 2003).
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relatively limited number of observations, we would not conclude from the standard
error that the reform did not affect this group, but rather that there is evidence for a
positive effect on secondary employment of single men. As columns 4 to 6 of Table 4
show, we do not find a corresponding effect for women.18
3.3 Effects for Students
The estimation results for students can be found in Table 5.19 Similar to what we
found for women with respect to marginal employment, for students there is a positive
and significant “raw” effect of the reform. Students in the second and third quarter of
2003 are more likely to be observed in marginal employment or holding a secondary
job than in the first quarter of 2003.
Table 5: Estimation Results (Marginal Effects) - Marginal
and/or Secondary Employment for Students
Variable Students
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
after 0.0639*** 0.0500** 0.0465**
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0193)
d2003 0.0379***
(0.0112)
after×2003 0.0042
(0.0267)
Controlled for Covariates no yes yes
Log-Likelihhod -1161.7 -1134.1 -2197.5
Observations 2,295 2,295 4,703
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) correct for correlation across re-
peated observations of individuals.
Covariates include: age, age2, no education, high school degree,
vocational training, academic, disabled, married, single, german,
number of children in different age classes, and a dummy for living
in East Germany. See also Table A.4.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
This is still true once we control for socio-demographic characteristics. The difference-
in-differences model, however, shows that there is no causal effect of the reform, even
18Once again we evaluated the marginal effects also for several subgroups. In none of these cases
we could find a significant effect.
19Table A.3 in the Appendix contains the total number of observations for this group as well as the
numbers on being marginally employed and/or holding a secondary job. Due to the limited number
of observations we pooled male and female observations and included a control variable for gender.
Full estimation results can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
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though the probability of being marginally employed or holding a secondary job is
higher in 2003 and in the second and third quarter of each year.20
To sum up, we find that in the short run, there is evidence that the reform had a
causal effect for single men, whose probability of having a secondary job increases by
about three percent. According to our estimation results, the reform had no causal
effect on marginal employment in any of the subgroups, although we do find a general
rise in marginal employment in the second quarter of 2003 as compared to previous
periods.
4 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to evaluate the causal effect of the German “Mini-Job”
reform from 2003 on the probabilities of being in marginal employment or of having a
secondary job. Based on our identification strategy, we were able to identify the short-
run effects of the reform. Disentangling seasonal or cyclical trends from causal effects
is a major requirement in order to draw policy-relevant conclusions. For example,
we find that for women and students marginal employment is higher in the summer
months (compared to the first quarter) and in the year 2003 (compared to the year
2002). This increase might have been reflected in the numbers—a short-run increase
of 79,000 jobs—reported by the Federal Employment Agency. However, we show that
this increase can not be causally related to the reform. As far as secondary jobs are
concerned, our results differ to a much larger extent from the numbers published by
the Federal Employment Agency. We only find evidence for a positive reaction to
the reform among single men, whose probability of having a secondary job increases.
However, this can not explain the total increase of 580,000 secondary jobs stated
above. We believe that a large fraction of these “new” jobs are actually redefinitions of
previously fake/false self-employment, i.e., a situation where a self-employed individual
is actually dependent on one company for (most of) her income. This effect cannot
be identified with the SOEP data. The same is true for turning illegal jobs into legal
employment (see also Schupp and Birkner, 2004).
All ex-ante evaluation studies using behavioural microsimulation models predict
20We also ran the same model including the variable after2003× single, which did not change the
results.
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similar effects from the “Mini-Job” reform suggesting only very moderate participa-
tion effects and even negative effects on working hours.21 They do find a small yet
significant effect on the labour force participation of women living in couple house-
holds. As described above, we do not find a significant effect on the participation in
marginal employment in the short-run. However, since the effects that are calculated
with ex-ante microsimulation techniques correspond to long-term effects, our results
need not necessarily be a contradiction to this literature.
Even though our results only reflect the short-run effects of the “Mini-Job” reform,
they are in line with what could be expected according to its set-up. As we have pointed
out, the reform was not explicitly targeted to subsidize employment in the low-wage
sector since there is no minimum hours restriction. Moreover, working incentives
for individuals receiving unemployment benefits or social assistance have hardly been
changed due to the strict withdrawal rate of earnings. The largest change was actually
the exemption from income taxation for earnings up to 400 Euro from a secondary job.
Hence, it is also questionable whether the reform will achieve its objective—to provide
positive work incentives for people with low earnings potential—in the long-run.
21See e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich (2005), Arntz, Feil, and Spermann (2003) or Bargain, Caliendo,
Haan, and Orsini (2006).
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Appendix - Tables
Table A.1: Estimation Results (Coefficients) for Men and Women - Marginal Em-
ployment - Full Model
Variable Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
after 0.106* 0.148** 0.05 0.107*** 0.029 0.083**
(0.055) (0.059) (0.058) (0.039) (0.04) (0.038)
d2003 0.062* 0.097***
(0.032) (0.020)
after×2003 0.095 -0.05
(0.081) (0.051)
after×2003×single 0.029 -0.021
(0.132) (0.099)
age -0.121*** -0.119*** 0.025*** 0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
age squared 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
no education -0.293 -0.225 -0.202 -0.215*
(0.228) (0.163) (0.131) (0.120)
high-school degree 0.392*** 0.349*** 0.067 0.021
(0.065) (0.057) (0.048) (0.043)
vocational training -0.026 -0.057 -0.156*** -0.163***
(0.062) (0.049) (0.039) (0.034)
academic -0.221*** -0.258*** -0.358*** -0.364***
(0.080) (0.075) (0.058) (0.054)
disabled -0.029 0.041 -0.307*** -0.234***
(0.084) (0.073) (0.075) (0.06)
single -0.006 -0.022 -0.013 0.01
(0.073) (0.062) (0.055) (0.047)
married -0.222*** -0.206*** 0.195*** 0.220***
(0.079) (0.063) (0.053) (0.043)
german -0.033 0.014 0.184*** 0.219***
(0.093) (0.077) (0.062) (0.055)
children under 15 -0.033 -0.056
(0.065) (0.052)
children under 1 -0.234** -0.199***
(0.099) (0.074)
children under 7 0.069 0.058
(0.048) (0.039)
children between 8-15 0.185*** 0.202***
(0.040) (0.033)
east german 0.039 0.032 -0.309*** -0.344***
(0.057) (0.049) (0.043) (0.037)
constant -1.705*** 0.598*** 0.486*** -1.101*** -1.493*** -1.495***
(0.026) (0.218) (0.182) (0.018) (0.168) (0.139)
Log-Likelihood -1666.8 -1529.5 -2919.3 -3829.5 -3664.7 -7183.4
Observations 8,907 8,907 18,154 9,444 9,444 19,215
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are corrected for correlation across repeated observations of individuals.
All variables except age and age squared are dummy variables, taking the value 1 if the con-
dition is fulfilled.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
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Table A.2: Estimation Results (Coefficients) for Men and Women - Secondary
Employment - Full Model
Variable Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
after 0.066 0.065 0.015 0.038 0.006 0.001
(0.072) (0.076) (0.071) (0.086) (0.090) (0.081)
d2003 0.023 -0.012
(0.039) (0.047)
after×2003 -0.02 0.024
(0.096) (0.122)
after×2003×single 0.320* -0.041
(0.172) (0.179)
age 0.02 0.043** 0.001 0.003
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020)
age squared -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
no education -0.058 -0.404 0.506* 0.38
(0.415) (0.387) (0.294) (0.251)
vocational training 0.234*** 0.113 -0.013 -0.059
(0.087) (0.07) (0.092) (0.074)
academic 0.108 0.091 0.185* 0.195**
(0.084) (0.07) (0.099) (0.081)
disabled 0.067 0.072 -0.154 0.046
(0.144) (0.116) (0.203) (0.140)
married 0.131 0.077 -0.124 -0.038
(0.098) (0.082) (0.107) (0.085)
single 0.117 -0.028 0.163 0.242***
(0.103) (0.096) (0.107) (0.083)
german 0.164 0.166 -0.096 0.027
(0.133) (0.112) (0.143) (0.120)
children under 15 -0.08 -0.059
(0.079) (0.065)
children under 1 -0.072 -0.100
(0.123) (0.097)
children between 8-15 -0.137 -0.108
(0.098) (0.075)
east german -0.121 -0.142** -0.156 -0.122
(0.082) (0.070) (0.097) (0.076)
civil servant 0.119 0.084 -0.320* -0.320**
(0.116) (0.099) (0.180) (0.134)
self-employed -0.377*** -0.293*** -0.18 -0.255
(0.138) (0.110) (0.184) (0.163)
industry class. 2 -0.107 -0.057 0.046 -0.066
(0.108) (0.093) (0.176) (0.166)
industry class. 3 0.031 0.124 -0.101 -0.148
(0.122) (0.099) (0.142) (0.112)
industry class. 4 -0.181 -0.165 -0.326 -0.264
(0.160) (0.126) (0.296) (0.248)
industry class. 5 0.184** 0.231*** 0.169 0.134
(0.093) (0.079) (0.107) (0.090)
industry class. 6 0.109 0.196** -0.112 -0.020
(0.119) (0.099) (0.155) (0.116)
industry class. 7 0.16 0.139 0.275* 0.257**
(0.139) (0.115) (0.151) (0.124)
Continued on next page.
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Table A.2 continued.
Variable Men Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
overtime (< 3h) -0.056 0.027 0.105 0.123*
(0.087) (0.067) (0.087) (0.064)
overtime (≥ 3h) 0.147** 0.163*** -0.024 0.007
(0.075) (0.059) (0.109) (0.077)
full-time employed -0.507*** -0.560*** -0.069 -0.148**
(0.140) (0.109) (0.085) (0.068)
constant -1.769*** -1.930*** -2.348*** -1.828*** -1.693*** -1.797***
(0.035 (0.502) (0.402) (0.041 (0.532) (0.397)
Log-Likelihood -929.1 -891.6 -1794.2 -665.8 -644.4 -1324.8
Observations 5564 5564 11466 4447 4447 9047
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are corrected for correlation across repeated observations of individuals.
All variables except age and age squared are dummy variables, taking the value 1 if the
condition is fulfilled.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
Table A.3: Number of Observations, Marginal
and/or Secondary Employment for Students in
the Subsamples
Marg. or Secon.
Employment
Subsample Obs. abs. in %
before 1778 274 0.05742002
after
April 1st
630 132 0.0873
before 1819 350 0.08082003
after
April 1st
476 122 0.1324
Note: High income sample of the SOEP is not in-
cluded, since this entire group was interviewed after
April in the 2003 wave. Numbers refer to the popula-
tion in “Ausbildung”.
Source: SOEP, waves 2002 and 2003.
22
Page 22 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table A.4: Estimation Results (Coefficients) for
Students - Marginal and/or Secondary Employ-
ment - Full Model
Variable Students
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
after 0.214*** 0.160** 0.159**
(0.071) (0.073) (0.068)
d2003 0.145***
(0.043)
after×2003 -0.005
(0.093)
age 0.060*** 0.048***
(0.021) (0.018)
female 0.204*** 0.229***
(0.061) (0.049)
age squared -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
no education
high-school degree
vocational training -0.239** -0.247***
(0.096) (0.077)
academic
disabled -0.514 -0.331
(0.314) (0.207)
single 0.033 0.083
(0.075) (0.060)
married -0.388*** -0.351***
(0.136) (0.105)
german 0.283** 0.178*
(0.126) (0.102)
children under 15 -0.134* -0.06
(0.071) (0.055)
east german -0.224*** -0.246***
(0.071) (0.058)
constant -0.869*** -2.025*** -1.889***
(0.034 (0.342) (0.285)
Log-Likelihhod -1161.7 -1134.1 -2197.5
Observations 2,295 2,295 4,703
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the
1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are corrected for correlation across repeated observa-
tions of individuals.
All variables except age and age squared are dummy
variables, taking the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled.
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2002 and
2003.
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Reply to the comments on 
„Evaluating the German Mini-Job Reform Using a Natural Experiment“ 
 
 
First of all, we would like to thank the referee for his/her valuable comments which helped to improve 
the paper. We will explain below in details how we incorporated the suggestions or indicate why we 
did not do so.  
 
Major Comments 
 
(1) Given the setup of the reform, one of its main effects should be that all existing employment 
contracts are changed and split in two parts, with a small part of 400 Euros being freed of income and 
social security taxes. This is not discussed (though briefly mentioned on the bottom of p.8) nor 
analyzed in the paper. Why not? 
Æ We discuss that now in more detail on page 8f. In fact, our analysis of secondary job holding is 
especially designed to detect such effects.   
 
(2) The authors' conclusions are predominantly based on observations in month 1 and 2 after the 
reform. It seems questionable that the effects of the reform are realized this fast given search, 
information, and administrative equirements connected to hiring. Are there any institutional reasons 
for not looking at the evidence of 2004? this might be a valuable addition. 
Æ Unfortunately, we cannot use information from the year 2004 for our analysis, since from 2004 
onwards various other legal changes have been introduced which might affect labour supply decisions 
of individuals simultaneously. Most significant of these were changes in the income tax as part of the 
German Tax Reform, increasing the basic allowance and decreasing the initial tax rate (see page 5 for 
more details).  
 
(3) If individuals who cannot be interviewed in the first quarter of the year systematically and in 
unobservable ways differ from others and if these differences are correlated to their response to the 
reform, the estimates are biased. The authors should explicitly state their assumption that the reform 
effect is identical for all, once the quarter of observation is conditioned out. Particularly in this 
application this assumption might matter, as those working on second jobs should be less likely to be 
met at home by interviewers. It is therefore not certain that the variation of interview months is 
random, as stated on p.5. 
Æ We discuss that in detail on page 6f. “A problem which might arise with this approach are potential 
differences in unobserved characteristics (UC) between individuals interviewed before April and those 
interviewed after April […]“. To account for these differences we apply a control mechanism based on 
the difference-in-differences (DID) approach. „Clearly, this assumption is only valid if both patterns 
have not changed over the two years, such that SEE2003 = SEE2002 and UC2003 = UC2002“.  
 
(4) The treatment of single vs. married vs. couple status of individuals is confusing. (a) Table 2 might 
present the test of mean equality also for the omitted category.  
Æ We present that now, see page 10. 
(b) The estimations use one omitted category for the level effects and a different one for the treatment 
effects. The discussion covers absolute effects without referring to reference groups. It should be 
clarified wether the estimates show the difference between singles and non-married couples or whether 
they discuss the absolute level of 
effects for singles. 
The marginal effects presented in Table 3 refer to absolute effects for singles and couples, as we 
explain in footnote 14. 
 (c) It might be of interest to - at least in a footnote - present the joint treatment effect (for singles and 
couples) and its significance instead of only presenting model 3. 
Æ We present the joint treatment effect now in the tablenotes to Tables 3 and 4. It is insignificant in 
both cases.  
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(5) The authors should explain their computation of the marginal effect as presented in footnote 13 
(e.g. by referring to equation 3). 
Ai and Norton (2003) show, that the magnitude of the interaction effect in non-linear models does not 
equal the marginal effect of the interaction term. Thus, we calculate the interaction effect using the 
formula stated in footnote 14 (formerly 13). We have clarified that in this footnote, see page 12. 
 
 
Minor Comments 
(1) Some references to the German institutional background are difficult to understand: 
explain "fake self-employment" (p.16). 
Æ We have rephrased that.  
(2) Is the Orsini 2006 reference cited in the paper? 
Æ Yes, in footnote 1 on page 1.  
(3) Some typos 
- middle of p2 "maximum hours restriction" 
- top of p5 "groups which"  
- top of p8 "the strong increase ... was" 
Æ We have corrected all typos.  
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